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Abstract
The publication of the EPR paper in 1935 prompted Heisenberg to
draft a manuscript on the question of the completability of quantum
mechanics (which was published only posthumously). We give here
the English translation of this manuscript with a brief introduction
and bibliography.
Introduction
Immediately following the publication of the EPR paper in the spring of
1935, Pauli wrote to Heisenberg suggesting he should develop his own re-
sponse to it. Heisenberg took up Pauli’s suggestion, and on 2 July, he sent
Pauli a draft entitled: ‘Ist eine deterministische Erga¨nzung der Quanten-
mechanik mo¨glich?’1 At the end of August, Heisenberg also sent a carbon
copy of a typescript to Bohr, asking for comments, and mentioning he was
thinking of sending it to Die Naturwissenschaften for publication.2 Bohr
was puzzled by certain aspects of the argumentation. Although Heisenberg
clarified these aspects in a subsequent letter, he postponed the decision to
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1Pauli to Heisenberg, 15 June 1935 (Pauli 1985, pp. 402–405), and Heisenberg to Pauli,
2 July 1935 (Pauli 1985, pp. 407–409) (both in German).
2Unfortunately, this carbon copy is not in the Niels Bohr Archive.
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publish until further discussion with Bohr in October in Copenhagen.3 As
it happens, the paper was never published during Heisenberg’s lifetime. A
not quite faultless transcription was published in volume 2 of Pauli’s scien-
tific correspondence (Pauli 1985, pp. 409–418). The original manuscript is
in Heisenberg’s Nachlaß in the Werner-Heisenberg-Archiv in Munich, and is
reproduced in the Archive for the History of Quantum Physics (microfilm
45, section 11).
More than a direct reply to the EPR paper, Heisenberg’s draft is a
presentation of Heisenberg’s own views about the completeness of quantum
mechanics. In particular, the draft contains what appears to be Heisenberg’s
fullest presentation of his argument about the movable ‘cut’ between what
is counted as part of the system to be observed and what is counted as part
of the means of observation (this constitutes the bulk of Heisenberg’s §1).
It also contains (at the beginning of §2) what appears to be the earliest
distinction between what are now called ‘contextual’ and ‘non-contextual’
hidden variables, even though Heisenberg quickly dismisses the contextual
case as irrelevant.
The crux of Heisenberg’s argument is presented in the remainder of his
§2. He argues that the only place where additional variables could supple-
ment the quantum mechanical description is at the location of the cut, say
between the system A to be measured and a measuring device B. The cut,
being movable, could also be placed between the combined system A + B
and a further system C. In this case A+ B can be given an entirely quan-
tum mechanical description. As a consequence, system B might be used to
measure a variable that is complementary to the one originally considered
(say, momentum rather than position). It was this particular step in the ar-
gument that was most unclear to Bohr. If we grant the point, however, the
assumed supplementation of the quantum mechanical description by way of
additional variables (say, position) turns out to be incompatible, according
to Heisenberg, with the quantum mechanical predictions for the measure-
ment of the complementary variable. The latter point is illustrated with
3Heisenberg to Bohr, 28 August 1935, Bohr to Heisenberg, 15 September 1935, Heisen-
berg to Bohr, 29 September 1935, Bohr to Heisenberg, 1 October 1935 (AHQP-BSC, mi-
crofilm 20, section 2), and Heisenberg to Bohr, 5 October 1935 (BSCSupp-HEI-351005t)
(Heisenberg’s letters in German, Bohr’s letters in Danish). In a further letter to Mar-
garethe Bohr dated 13 September 1935 (BSCSupp-HEI-350913t, in German), Heisenberg
states explicitly that he will not send off the manuscript until he and Bohr have agreed
on the content.
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an example used by Heisenberg already in 1927, where he argues that the
assumption of particle trajectories in a diffraction experiment on a grating
is incompatible with the observed quantum mechanical interference.4
Heisenberg’s final §3 summarises the preceding argument by reference
to Grete Hermann’s regrettably little-known essay ‘Die naturphilosophi-
schen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik’ (Hermann 1935a). Indeed, one
can recognise the similarity with some of Hermann’s main views in most of
the section (except for the wavefunction example used by Heisenberg).5
We have given an analysis of Heisenberg’s draft in a recent paper (Bac-
ciagaluppi and Crull 2009). Some aspects of Heisenberg’s draft are further
clarified by the correspondence with Bohr, in particular Heisenberg’s letter
to Bohr of 29 September 1935, which clarifies in what sense system B can be
used to measure two complementary variables. What was referred to implic-
itly here was the Heisenberg microscope, in which the electron A interacts
with the photon B, which is then chosen to be observed either in the image
plane (yielding a measurement of position) or the focal plane of the micro-
scope C (yielding a measurement of momentum). Making the reference to
the Heisenberg microscope explicit further emphasises the parallels between
Heisenberg’s and Hermann’s views.
The present translation is based on Heisenberg’s manuscript and corrects
the mistakes in the published transcription of 1985. We have footnoted all
discrepancies (giving first the manuscript reading, then the transcription),
except when they constitute merely differences in spelling or punctuation
with no implications for the meaning of the sentence. We include in our
bibliography below also the complete version of the references given by
Heisenberg in the original footnotes.
For permission to translate Heisenberg’s manuscript, we wish to thank
most warmly Helmut Rechenberg of the Werner-Heisenberg-Archiv in Mu-
4Heisenberg to Einstein, 10 June 1927 (Albert Einstein Archive 12–174.00, in German).
5Hermann’s paper is one of the earliest and best philosophical treatments of the new
quantum mechanics. Some of her views have been discussed by Jammer (1974, pp. 207–
208), but very little of her work has been translated into English. See Seevinck (no
date) for an online translation of Hermann’s section 7, which criticises von Neumann’s
no-hidden-variables proof, and Hermann (1996) for a complete translation into French
with an extensive introduction and commentary by L. Soler (see also Soler 2009). Her-
mann (1999) is an English translation by D. Lumma of Hermann’s shorter paper for Die
Naturwissenschaften (Hermann 1935b).
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nich. We are also very grateful to Helge Kragh for help with the Bohr–
Heisenberg correspondence, to Felicity Pors for help with the materials in
the Niels Bohr Archive, and to Don Howard for having suggested we collab-
orate on this project.
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W. Heisenberg: Is a deterministic completion of
quantum mechanics possible?
The laws of quantum mechanics contain in many cases statements about the
probability for a definite event taking place. Although this statistical char-
acter of quantum mechanics is intimately connected to the general features
of the description of nature investigated by Bohr6 that have come to light
in atomic physics and are described by the concept of ‘complementarity’,
yet, in discussions on7 atomic theory the question is raised again and again
whether quantum mechanics might not be amended later to a deterministic
theory through new physical results.8 It is natural to consider quantum
mechanics at first to be an incomplete description of nature; for it seems to
follow from entirely general principles that wherever an exact prediction of
what happens in the future has not succeeded, this failure should be seen as
signalling the presence of a problem that is yet unsolved and will need to be
solved in the future. An argument of this kind, in light of the experimental
success of quantum mechanics, assumes in general that quantum mechanics
gives a correct description of nature. However, it ties this assumption to
the hope that later research will bring to light a hitherto hidden network of
causal connections behind the statistical connections of quantum mechanics
– rather like the way classical mechanics is hidden behind the tempera-
ture and entropy concepts of thermodynamics. These causal connections
need not refer at all to anschaulich classical variables of physical systems.
Rather, it is inferred from the validity of the indeterminacy relations that
classical concepts allow no adequate description of atomic phenomena, that
therefore one needs to develop new concepts to be perhaps associated with
hitherto unknown physical properties of atomic systems. For instance, apart
from the physical properties that are exhaustively specified by determining
its stationary state, the nucleus of the radium atom could, say, possess still
other hitherto unknown physical properties, knowledge of which would make
possible an exact prediction of the time of radioactive decay. The following
considerations are meant to show under very general assumptions that such
a deterministic completion of quantum mechanics is impossible, thus that
one might maintain the hope for a description of nature that is determinis-
6N. Bohr, Solvay Conference 1927; Naturwiss. 16, 245 (1928); Atomtheorie und
Naturbeschreibung. Berlin 1931; Faraday-lecture, Journ. of the Chem. Soc. 1932. p. 349;
Lys og liv, Natur. Verden 17, 49 (193[3]). Phys. Rev. Forthcoming [presumably (1935)].
7[u¨ber/um]
8E.g., M. v. Laue, Naturw. 20, 115 (1932); Naturwiss. 22, 439 (1934); E. Schro¨dinger,
Naturwiss. 22, 518 (1934); A. Einstein [et al.], Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (1935).
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tic in the traditional sense only if one chose to consider the most important
experimental successes of quantum mechanics to be accidental. The essen-
tial content of the following trains of thought is already to be found in the
earliest discussions of the fundamental interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics;9 presenting it anew is perhaps nonetheless justified by the criticism of
quantum mechanics repeatedly expressed in the most recent literature.
§1. Quantum mechanics represents a physical system by a wavefunction
in a configuration space whose number of dimensions is determined by the
number of degrees of freedom of the system in question. The square of the
absolute value of the wavefunction at a specific point of this space gives the
probability that the anschaulich physical quantities denoted by the coordi-
nates of the space take on the specific values corresponding to that point,
if the system is observed with regard to these values. The formalism of
quantum mechanics is thus based on the assumption that a physical system
can be represented by classical-anschaulich variables, and that, as in classi-
cal theory, there can be an objective sense independent of the processes of
observation in speaking of the actual value of a specific physical quantity,
e.g. of the ‘position of the electron’.
The quantum mechanical way of describing nature thus begins with a
peculiar rift: on the one hand, one proceeds from the assumption that the
task of physics is the description and synthesis in terms of laws of an-
schaulich,objective processes in space and time; on the other hand, one
uses for the mathematical description of physical processes these wavefunc-
tions10 in multi-dimensional configuration spaces, which in no way can be
seen simply as representatives of the objective happening in space and time,
as can, say, the coordinates of a point-mass in classical mechanics. This rift
manifests itself in an arbitrariness in the application of quantum mechanics:
should only the atomic system to be observed be represented by a wave-
function, and the devices used for its11 observation be treated according to
the laws of classical physics, or should also the devices be represented by
wavefunctions according to the laws of quantum mechanics, where in the
end only the observation of the measuring device, say, the observation of
9N. Bohr, l.c.; W. Heisenberg, Z. Phys. 43, 172 (1927). Cf. also W. Heisenberg: Die
physikalischen Prinzipien der Quantentheorie. Leipzig 1930; J. v. Neumann: Mathemati-
sche Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Berlin 1932; W. Pauli: Die allgemeinen Prinzipien
der Wellenmechanik. Handbuch der Physik, Vol. 24, 1st Part. Berlin 1933.
10[Wellenfunktionen/Wellenfunktion]
11[seiner/dieser]
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a line on a photographic plate, is taken to be a classical-anschaulich pro-
cess? At what place should one draw the cut between the description by
wavefunctions and the classical-anschaulich description?
The answer to this question is: the quantum mechanical predictions about
the outcome of an arbitrary experiment are independent of the location of
the cut just12 discussed. Since this theorem is of crucial importance for the
internal coherence [fu¨r den inneren Zusammenhang] of quantum mechanics,
its13 proof shall be given here in detail.
Let an atomic system A be given, from which information reaches the
observer by means of the measuring devices B, C, etc. The systems B, C...
should be capable of being regarded as measuring devices in the sense of
classical physics, i.e. from a specific reaction, say, of system C, it should be
possible to infer univocally to a reaction of system B, and from14 this to a
specific behaviour of A.
Atomic System A → B → C → ... → Observer.
For this to be possible, a certain physical interaction between the systems
A, B, C, etc., must be present. For example, it could be that the interaction
energy between A and B is non-zero only when the coordinates qA of system
A possess the quite specific values q′A. From the occurrence of a reaction
in B one could then infer that the coordinates of A have in fact assumed
these particular values q′A. Let us make this special assumption about the
interaction energy between A and B, since the essential content of the proof
to be carried out can already be made clear in this special case.
A physical process taking place in system A can, on the one hand,
be described by the time-dependent wavefunction ψA(qA, t) of system A.
|ψA(q′A, t′)|2 gives then the probability that at time t = t′, the15 coordinates
qA assume the values q′A. One will thus assume with probability |ψA(q′A, t′)|2
(up to a constant factor depending on the sensitivity of the measuring in-
struments) that the measuring devices react when the interaction between
A and B is switched on at time t′. To the measuring instruments B, C, etc.,
one applies in this treatment just the laws of classical physics.
12[eben/oben]
13[sein/mein]
14[aus/von]
15[Missing ‘die’ in the transcription.]
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But on the other hand, one can incorporate also system B into the
quantum mechanical formalism by starting with a wavefunction16 for the
total system A+B. From this wavefunction, the probability that system B
reacts can then be inferred, and it is to be proved that this probability, up
to a constant factor, is again given by |ψA(q′A, t′)|2.
Before switching on the interaction between A and B, the wavefunction
of system A+B is given by the product ψA(qA, t)·ψB(qB, t), where ψB(qB, t)
represents the state of system B before the onset of the reaction. We now
separate the Hamiltonian function of the total system A+B into the three
parts HA, HB and HAB, the first two of which refer to the systems A andB,
while HAB denotes the interaction between A and B, which differs from zero
only at the point qA = q′A and becomes effective only from time t = t
′. The
Schro¨dinger equation of the system A+B then reads17(~
i
∂
∂t
+HA +HB
)
ψ(qA, qB, t) = −HAB ψ(qA, qB, t) . (1)
If one is interested only in the behaviour of the system shortly after time
t = t′, one can substitute for ψ(qA, qB, t) on the right-hand side of this
equation the ‘undisturbed’ value ψA(qA, t′)ψB(qB, t′). Further, since the
interaction energy HAB differs from zero only at the point qA = q′A, the
right-hand side can be replaced by HAB ψA(q′A, t
′)ψB(qB, t′). From this it
transpires that the solution of the Schro¨dinger equation for times shortly
after t = t′ can be represented in the form
ψ(qA, qB, t) = ψA(qA, t)ψB(qB, t) + ψA(q′A, t
′)ϕ(qA, qB, t, t′) ,
where the function ϕ(qA, qB, t, t′) no longer depends on the behaviour of
system A before time t′. The probability that system B has undergone
a reaction, that it is therefore no longer in the initial state represented by
ψB(qB, t), is given by the deviation of the wavefunction from ψA(qA, t)ψB(qB, t),
and thus, according to the rules of quantum mechanics, essentially given by∫
dqA dqB|ψA(q′A, t′)ϕ(qA, qB, t, t′)|2
= |ψA(q′A, t′)|2
∫
dqA dqB|ϕ(qA, qB, t, t′)|2 .
Thus this18 probability turns out to be proportional to |ψA(q′A, t′)|2 also ac-
16[Wellenfunktion/Zahlenfunktion]
17[~/h in the equation]
18[Diese/Die]
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cording to this second method of calculation, where the remaining constant
factor depends only on system B and its interaction with A, but not on the
prior history of system A. One could, in the same way, incorporate also
system C into the quantum mechanical formalism, and one would arrive at
the same end result by very similar calculations. For the prediction of a
given physical event, it is thus indeed indifferent at which place one draws
the cut between the classical and quantum mechanical treatment.
The content of this proof can be presented in a somewhat more general
form as follows. System B is meant to function as the measuring device for
the coordinates qA of A. For this it is necessary that, when the interaction
between A and B is switched on, a specific value q′A corresponds to some
specific reaction in B, e.g. the transition of the coordinate qB from the
value q′B to the value q
′′
B. In the language of wave mechanics, this means:
when the interaction is switched on, the evolution of the specific solution
to the Schro¨dinger equation with the wavefunction initially differing from
zero only in the neighbourhood of q′A and q
′
B, is such that
19 the projec-
tion of the wave packet onto the space of the qB describes a motion from
q′B to q
′′
B. This is (in this example) the necessary condition for B being a
measuring device. Now, before switching on, thus as long as the systems
are still independent, the wavefunction is given by the product of the wave-
functions of the subsystems. One can track the temporal evolution of the
total wavefunction20 most easily by constructing it as a superposition of the
wave packets just21 described. The total wavefunction then appears (for a
short time after switching on the interaction) as a product of two factors,
one of which is given by the wavefunction of the system A to be observed
at the time when the interaction is switched on, while the other represents
the reaction of the measuring device B. From this follows again the result22
discussed above. The most essential properties of the quantum mechanical
formalism23 this proof relies on are: first, the fact that any enlargement of
the physical system one is describing is represented by an increase in the
number of dimensions of the configuration space; second, the possibility of
obtaining new solutions through superposition of different solutions to the
Schro¨dinger equation. In addition, in the quantum mechanical representa-
19[so, dass/so daß]
20[Gesamtwellenfunktion/Gesamtwellenfunktionen]
21[eben/etwa]
22[Ergebnis/System]
23[des quantenmechanischen Formalismus/der Quantenmechanik den Formalismus]
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tion of the measuring device we have relied on the known24 relation between
geometrical optics and wave optics. However, it follows from this that the
classical-theoretical causal connections that are employed in the measuring
devices can be reproduced in quantum mechanics only to the degree of pre-
cision to which the anschaulich classical variables of the measuring devices
can be represented in the wave picture. However, in all practical cases the
fundamental indeterminacy brought about in this way by the indeterminacy
relations in the formulation of those causal connections is much smaller than
the practical uncertainty that must be allowed for in every measuring device,
even the best. Devices in which the said fundamental uncertainty plays a
larger role would not be capable of being regarded as measuring devices in
the ordinary sense, and of being treated according to classical theory.25 The
claim made earlier, that it is indifferent at which location the cut between
the parts of the system to be treated quantum mechanically26 and the clas-
sical measuring devices should be drawn, should thus be made more precise
in the sense that this cut may indeed be shifted arbitrarily far in the direc-
tion of the observer in the region that is otherwise described according to
the laws of classical physics; but that this cut cannot be shifted arbitrarily
in the direction of the atomic system. Rather, there are physical systems
– and all atomic systems belong among these – that the classical concepts
are unsuitable to describe, and whose behaviour can therefore be expressed
correctly only in the language of wavefunctions.
Wave mechanics is capable of reproducing classical causal connections
in the sense just discussed only because its formalism – exactly like that of
classical mechanics – itself contains univocal connections [in sich eindeutig
zusammenha¨ngt]; in its formalism, the temporal evolution of the wavefunc-
tion can be inferred univocally from the initial values of this function with
the help of the Schro¨dinger equation. The statistical element enters quan-
tum mechanical statements only through the ‘cut’, where the partly un-
24[bekannt/bestimmt]
25[Marked ‘Anm.’ in the manuscript, but part of the main text in the transcription:]
At this point, attention must be drawn also to a third category of measuring devices,
which employ univocal causal connections that, however, cannot be followed in detail
within classical theory. As an example, one can take the devices with which one detects
the presence of neutrons in a specific position by generating artificial radioactivity. The
physical processes that take place between the capture of the neutron and the creation
and emission of the electron cannot be described in the framework of classical theory.
Nevertheless, we have here a measuring device that allows for univocal inferences and can
for instance play the role of system B in the proof we have discussed.
26[den quantenmechanisch zu behandelnden/dem quanten-mechanisch zu behandelnden]
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controllable27 disturbance necessarily tied to every observation can be held
responsible for the appearance of statistical connections.
§2. After these preliminaries we return to the question posed at the
beginning, whether the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are
capable of a deterministic completion. We shall thus investigate the as-
sumption that the physical systems about which quantum mechanics makes
statistical statements are bearers of hitherto unknown physical properties
that determine univocally the behaviour hitherto known only statistically.
For example, let the nucleus of the radium atom possess, apart from the
properties that are fixed by the knowledge of its stationary state, still other
hitherto unknown properties whose knowledge makes possible an exact pre-
diction of when the atomic nucleus will emit an α-particle. And we assume
specifically: this statement should hold independently of the means of ob-
servation that are used to detect the α-particle.28
One might at first be tempted to drop this last special assumption, and
consider that the radioactive emission may also depend on the properties of
the means of observation. But this gain in generality is only apparent. For
instance, one could count as part of the system to be observed the counter
device and the photographic plate that bf instead of: which registers the
events [ihre Anschla¨ge]. Then the question of the blackening of the plate re-
places the question of the emission of the α-particle. And here, one is surely
forced to assume that whether or not the blackening of the plate occurs is
entirely independent of how the observer later takes a look at the plate. For
our description of nature is based in the end on the assumption that one
can speak of objective events in space and time. It would be altogether
impossible to speak of the correctness of the predictions of any theory if one
did not assume that the occurrence of a particular event is an objective fact
that does not depend on our observation of this event. Classical physics
defines the domain29 within which we can objectify our perceptions unprob-
lematically. – If one considers the blackening of a photographic plate to be
an objective fact in this way, then there is actually no further reason not to
consider also the emission of an α-particle to be an objective fact; except,
that is, if at some place between the macroscopic and the microscopic events
one assumes there is a discontinuity for which not the slightest indications
27[teilweise unkontrollierbare/teilweise nur kontrollierbare]
28[des α-Teilchens/der α-Teilchen]
29[Bereich/Beweis]
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are present either in experience or in the quantum mechanical formalism.
Accordingly, we must discuss the special assumption that a physical
system, for which quantum mechanics allows one to predict only30 the prob-
ability for the occurrence of a specific event, possesses still other hitherto
unknown properties, knowledge of which would make precise statements
possible about the occurrence of this event – independently of how the oc-
currence of the event is observed. It shall now be shown that this assump-
tion runs into contradiction with the statements of quantum mechanics.
And in fact not just with the statistical statements of quantum mechanics;
this would not be surprising, for the observation of the hitherto31 unknown
properties could make it possible to select specific systems from a quantum
mechanical ensemble, and one cannot expect that the same statistics hold
for individual systems selected according to specific points of view as for the
ensemble. Rather, the said assumption also comes into contradiction with
specific statements of quantum mechanics.
The reason for this contradiction lies in the already discussed fact that
the formalism of quantum mechanics itself establishes a univocal connection
between the quantities that it relates to each other, and that the quantum
mechanical statements acquire their statistical character only because at
the location separating the observer with his devices from the system to
be observed, a fundamentally32 uncontrollable disturbance of the system by
the means of observation prevents us from following the causal connections.
Let us thus place33 the cut in the above discussed scenario between, say, the
atomic system A and the device B. Then we would have to ascribe to system
A hitherto unknown properties that complement with specific statements the
statistical statements that are to be made about A according to quantum
mechanics. But now there is no reason within the framework of quantum
mechanics for not also placing the cut between systems B and C rather than
between A andB. Then the systems A andB are univocally connected in the
formalism of quantum mechanics, and every statement about A not already
contained in this univocal connection can run into contradiction with what
this connection implies.
In detail, the contradiction arises in the following way: on the one hand,
30[nur/und]
31[bisher/beiden]
32[prinzipiell/prinzipielle]
33[Legen wir also/Leben wir also]
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it is meant to follow from the knowledge of the hitherto hidden physical
properties of system A, that A in its interaction with34 any physical system,
thus in particular with B, reacts as if the coordinate qA had the value q′A.
But on the other hand B can be so chosen that according to quantum me-
chanics its reaction to A proceeds differently. For instance (as opposed to
the above discussed example) B can measure a property of A complemen-
tary to qA. Then the possibility of a reaction of system B, as determined by
quantum mechanics, rests precisely on the freedom that still obtains in the
value of qA; thus B’s reaction to A is different to what would follow from the
coordinate qA having the value q′A. More generally:
35 the quantum mechan-
ical formalism that is applied to the total system A+B contains no freedom
whatsoever, and leaves no place for additional assumptions regarding the
effect of A on B; just as little as the mathematical framework of classical
mechanics would. There would be room for complementing the quantum
mechanical statements only at the location of the cut; but this location can-
not be determined physically, indeed, it is precisely the arbitrariness in the
choice of the location of the cut that is crucial for the application of quantum
mechanics. Any hitherto unknown physical properties, which would then be
necessarily tied to their specific physical system, are thus fundamentally
unsuitable for complementing the quantum mechanical statements.
One can easily illustrate this state of affairs with the above mentioned
example of the radioactive atomic nucleus. The α-particles leave the atomic
nucleus with an energy that is fixed up to quantities of the order ~/T , if one
takes T to be the average decay time of the atomic nucleus. One can let
this α-radiation impinge on a diffraction grating of very high resolution, and
according to the laws of quantum mechanics, one can be certain that (if the
decay time is not too short) the α-radiation is reflected by the grating only
in one of the extraordinarily sharply determined directions that according
to the laws of interference correspond to the de Broglie wavelength of the α-
rays. Now, if there were hitherto unknown physical properties of the atomic
nucleus allowing one to predict in which direction and at what moment the
α-particle is emitted, then one could calculate what part of the diffraction
grating is hit by the α-particle, and when it is hit. The direction of reflection
of the α-particle could then (up to negligibly small corrections) only depend
on the properties, at the time of the impact, of that part of the grating that
is hit, because whatever the interaction, the α-particle ought to be found at
34[Spurious ‘B’ in the transcription.]
35[‘Allgemeiner:’ missing in the transcription.]
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the predicted36 position in question – that was the assumption made above
–, thus it cannot interact with the distant parts of the grating. On the other
hand, according to quantum mechanics, it is precisely the distant parts of
the grating that are crucial in determining the direction of reflection. Thus
a contradiction arises. If one replaces the radioactive atomic nucleus in the
above discussed example with a sodium atom emitting light belonging to the
D-line, one recognises immediately that this contradiction does not arise only
in thought experiments that are hard to verify. A definite prediction of the
position at which the light quantum hits the diffraction grating would be in
contradiction with the occurrence of a sharp diffraction phenomenon.
However, the strength of this example37 rests crucially on the assumption
that the localisation of an α-particle or light quantum applies to every kind of
interaction, that one can thus speak of the location of the α-particle with the
same right as of the location of a macroscopic object. If one does not accept
this, then one should apply the same argument to a system for which there
can be no doubt about the applicability of classical anschaulich concepts,
thus one should include a part of the macroscopic measuring devices38 in
the system.
With this argument one can also counter the objection that inferences
to the statistical character of atomic physics are not conclusive, because the
concepts there used of corpuscle and wave, light quantum and field are in
fact unsuitable for describing the physical conditions, and therefore will have
to be replaced later by other conceptions. This objection overlooks that in
the end the application of the quantum mechanical formalism does not re-
quire at all the use of these concepts, thus also that nothing is gained by
eliminating these concepts. For quantum mechanics can always be treated
such that part of the measuring devices can be counted as part of the system
to be observed, and represented by wavefunctions. Then, the results of the
quantum mechanical calculation include also anschaulich statements about
such things as pointer positions, blackening of plates and the like, in the
case of which one cannot doubt one is already using the correct concepts
for describing the physical conditions. It is a crucial feature of quantum
mechanics that its formalism allows us to link organically the physical do-
mains that are in principle beyond the reach of our Anschauung with the
36[vorhergesagten/vorhergegangenen]
37[dieses Beispiels/dieser Beispiele]
38[der makroskopischen Messapparate/des makroskopischen Meßapparates]
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macroscopic anschaulich domains, in such a way that the statements of the
formalism can be unambiguously expressed through anschaulich concepts.
Of course, quantum mechanics expressly assumes, just as in the argu-
ment carried out here, that it is possible after all to objectify our percep-
tions39 at some point, i.e. to speak of things and processes. Classical physics
proves that this is possible in a wide domain, and the whole of natural sci-
ence rests upon this possibility.
§3. The question posed at the beginning, whether a deterministic com-
pletion of quantum mechanics is possible, is thus to be answered in the neg-
ative. If one wants to express the reasons put forward for this in a simple
formula, then according to G. Hermann,40 one can say that a deterministic
completion of quantum mechanics is impossible for the reason that quan-
tum mechanics already allows the complete specification of the causes for
the occurrence of a definite measurement result. From this formulation the
question immediately arises, which feature of nature – obviously overlooked
by classical physics – is actually responsible for the fact that the formalism of
quantum mechanics, itself containing univocal connections [in sich eindeutig
zusammenha¨ngend], is not sufficient for calculating in advance all measure-
ment results, that therefore statistical connections appear at the location of
the cut. One recognises this feature best from a simple example: in the clas-
sical theory one could say of a particle that it moves with a definite velocity
at a definite position. If one wants to translate this statement (with the
inherent unavoidable unsharpness) into quantum theory, then one will say
that a wave packet in configuration space is moving with a definite velocity
at a definite position. Thereby, however, the state is not yet uniquely fixed.
Indeed, to fix it uniquely one must supply still further data about the size
and form of the wave packet, for which there are altogether no analogies41
in classical theory. Quantum mechanics has thus revealed to us here a new
property of nature that was unknown to classical physics.
Since knowledge of the quantum mechanical wavefunction can be gained
from a suitable observation of the system and is enough to determine for
later times which observations on the system will have results that can be
39[Wahrnehmungen/Wechselwirkungen]
40G. Hermann: Die [natur]philosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Berlin
1935. [Title amended already in the transcription.]
41[keine Analogien/kein Analogon]
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predicted exactly,42 one can speak of an ‘observational context’ specified43
by knowledge of the wavefunction. The example just discussed shows that
the same anschaulich process can belong to different observational contexts
– as opposed to classical physics, in which there is only a single observational
context. The experimental results accumulated in quantum mechanics have
further shown that the observation of a system in general leads discontin-
uously from one observational context to another. The causal flow can be
followed only within a given observational context; in the discontinuous tran-
sition from one observational context to another (in fact a ‘complementary’
one in the Bohrian sense), only statistical predictions are possible. The pos-
sibility of different complementary observational contexts, unknown to the
classical theory, is thus responsible for the occurrence of statistical laws.
After one manages to see that a deterministic completion of quantum
mechanics would lead to contradictions, one can pose the further question
whether a later modification of quantum mechanics might not open up the
possibility for such a deterministic completion. In attempting to answer this
further question, one can naturally only call upon the experimental results.
One can verify that the conclusions of §2 essentially make use only of the
results of quantum mechanics that have been repeatedly confirmed experi-
mentally; the most important example is given there by the experimentally
established fact that the radiation emitted by an atom can give rise to inter-
ference phenomena, even though the total energy of the radiation is eventu-
ally absorbed at a definite point (as a ‘light quantum’). Furthermore, one
can point to the fact that the statistical44 character of quantum mechanics is
very tightly bound to the formal circumstance that its mathematical frame-
work of wavefunctions operates in multi-dimensional configuration space,
not in ordinary space, and that precisely this feature of quantum mechanics
has been exactly confirmed through the correct reproduction of the more
complicated atomic spectra. Yet of course it can never be decided when a
sum of experimental results licenses conclusive inferences to a law.
Here for the moment one will have to be content with the observation
that neither the experimental results nor considerations of principle give
one grounds45 to believe that the future description of nature will let itself
be fitted into the narrow classical framework of an anschaulich and causal
42[exakt/nicht]
43[charakterisierten/charakteristischen]
44[statistische/natu¨rliche]
45[Anlass bieten/Anlaß bilden]
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description of objective processes in space and time.
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